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IBM’s Chess Players: On AI and Its Supplements
Brian P. Bloomfield and Theo Vurdubakis
Centre for the Study of Technology and Organisation, Department of Organisation, Work,
and Technology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom
This article investigates the ways in which the reporting of tech-
nological developments in artificial intelligence (AI) can serve as
occasions in which Occidental modernity’s cultural antinomies are
played out. It takes as its reference point the two chess tourna-
ments (in 1996 and 1997) between the then world champion Gary
Kasparov and the IBM dedicated chess computers Deep Blue and
Deeper Blue and shows how these games of chess came to be seen as
an arena where fundamental issues pertaining to human identity
were contested. The article considers the dominant framing of these
encounters in terms of a conflict between two opposed categories—
“human” and “machine”—and argues the essential role of human
agency, the human supplement, in the performances of machine
intelligence.
Keywords agency, artificial intelligence, computer chess, Deep Blue,
human identity
David: Open the pod bay doors, please, Hal. . . Open
the pod bay doors, please, Hal. . . Hello, Hal, do you read
me? . . . Hello, Hal, do you read me?. . . Do you read me,
Hal?. . . Do you read me, Hal?. . . Hello, Hal do you read
me?. . . Hello, Hal, do you read me?. . . Do you read me, Hal?
HAL: Affirmative, Dave, I read you.
David: Open the pod bay doors, Hal.
HAL: I’m sorry, Dave, I’m afraid I can’t do that.
David: What’s the problem?
HAL: I think you know what the problem is just as well as I
do.
(2001 A Space Odyssey [dir. Stanley Kubrick, 1967]; screen-
play by Stanley Kubrick and Arthur C. Clarke)
Debates over what “intelligent machines” can, or cannot,
do are often tinged with unease. This unease is the subject
of one of the illustrations in Raymond Kurzweil’s The Age
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of Spiritual Machines (1999, p. 197). The picture depicts a
human figure (representing the “human race”) deep in the
throes of an existential crisis as he tries to identify those
intellectual attributes that account for the superiority of hu-
man over machine “thinking.” His endeavour appears to
have been repeatedly stymied by the relentless “march of
the machines.”1 with discarded propositions—“only hu-
mans can prove important theorems,” “only humans can
recognize faces,” “only humans can pick stocks,” etc.—
that have fallen like autumn leaves in the winds of techno-
logical progress. Only a few such claims are still defiantly
pinned to the walls. It is clear that his Canute-like2 hope to
hold back the technological tide is as futile as it is miscon-
ceived. Nevertheless, his anxiety remains understandable.
For a long time Occidental culture defined “thinking” as
something that only humans could do, and “intelligence”
as something that only humans could posses. Thus the
possibility of an artificial intelligence can be perceived
as an erosion of what it means to be human, a bound-
ary violation that generates feelings of anxiety and unease
(Douglas, 1966; Bloomfield & Vurdubakis, 1997, 2003).
As Isaac Asimov notes, “the ultimate machine is an intelli-
gent machine,” and our great fear is “that it will [ultimately]
supplant us” (1981, p. 136).3 Kurzweil (1999) offers a
timetable for when we might expect that to happen.4 We
could therefore name (after Asimov) the cultural unease
that attends the notion of an artificial intelligence “dis-
placement anxiety.” Of course, the anxiety experienced by
the human subject when faced with evidence of the agency
of the object is a frequently recurring theme in Western
popular culture, from Mary Shelley’s (1992) Frankenstein
to the Terminator (dir. Cameron, 1984, 1991; Mostow,
2004) and Matrix (dir. Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999,
2003) film trilogies. Perhaps its most memorable drama-
tization is in Stanley Kubrick’s (1967) classic 2001 and in
particular the famous scene in which the on-board com-
puter HAL 9000 denies astronaut David Bowman reentry
into the spaceship (quoted earlier in this article). The cre-






























70 B. P. BLOOMFIELD AND T. VURDUBAKIS
We could say that AI is as much a cultural construct
as it is a techno-scientific research program. In fact, it
was the former some time before it became the latter. As
the celebrations and reflections that marked HAL’s 1997
“birthday” have underscored, our collective understand-
ing of what an “artificial intelligence” might be like owes
perhaps as much to science fiction as it does to science
(e.g., Stork, 1997).6 Clearly, the media play an impor-
tant role in this trafficking in representations. The esoteric
(Fleck, 1979) character of most technical and scientific
work means that the only way it ever reaches a wider pub-
lic is through the intercession of various representational
media (Suchman, 2007). In the course of such mediations,
techno-scientific developments become invested with spe-
cific cultural meanings and significance by being put in
the context of familiar stories. Dorothy Nelkin (1987, p.
2) goes as far as to argue that for most people “the reality
of [techno-]science is what they read in the press. They
understand science less through direct experience or past
education than through the filter of journalistic language
and imagery.” However, such “popularization”—if that is
the right term—is not, as often claimed, a mere rendering
of scientific work into more digestible language. Rather,
it constitutes a literary enterprise in its own right, one that
uses particular technical and scientific developments as its
sources of inspiration (Caro, 1997) while, arguably, also
contributing to the shaping of cultural expectations regard-
ing techno-scientific work (Fleck, 1979).
In what follows we attempt a critical examination of
some aspects of what we might call the “literary enter-
prise of AI.” More specifically, we focus on the 1996 and
1997 chess competitions between world champion Gary
Kasparov and IBM’s dedicated chess computers Deep Blue
and Deeper Blue. These contests are typically viewed as
epitomizing the process through which claims about what
intelligent machines are, or are not, capable of, find their
way—metaphorically speaking—from the wall to the floor
of Kurzweil’s distressed man (e.g., Dennett, 1996; Pan-
dolfini, 1997; Cook & Kroker, 1997). In contrast, our
aim is to investigate these tournaments as cultural events,
as staged occasions for the rehearsal and dramatization
of various philosophical and moral conflicts character-
istic of Western modernity. Of course, imagery of con-
flict tends to be a rather overused commodity. Media ac-
counts, in particular, often endeavor to drum up interest
by (over)using the language of conflict to frame the other-
wise “dry” techno-scientific “facts.” And yet the success
of such accounts in attracting readers and viewers (demon-
strated by the migration from specialist to general news and
media) crucially depends on whether they resonate with
their cultural myths, their “deep stories”: for instance, the
conflict between creator and creation that forms a central
element in the Frankenstein mythos (Turney, 1998). The
(re)enactment of such conflicts in current cultural prob-
lematizations of artificial intelligence is discussed here in
terms of the ongoing discursive (re)constructions of the
“human,” the “machine,” and of “intelligence,” the pre-
sumed sign of ontological difference between them. After
a brief discussion of the historical antecedents, an analysis
of the chess games played between the emblematic repre-
sentatives of the two categories—Kasparov and Deep(er)
Blue—is provided as a way of exploring how a game of
chess came to be presented as an arena where fundamen-
tal issues pertaining to human identity were contested.
Finally, the implications of this analysis for what we might
call the “public understanding” of AI are discussed.
“LAST MAN STANDING”
The “facts of the matter” are already well known: In Febru-
ary 1996 in Philadelphia, the (then) world chess cham-
pion Gary Kasparov played a six game chess tourna-
ment against IBM’s Deep Blue. Kasparov lost the opening
game—the first time the world champion had lost to a ma-
chine in a game played at the classic rate (of 3 minutes per
move)—but then went on to win the tournament by 4 points
to 2. The year of HAL’s birthday was also the year when
the much anticipated rematch took place in New York. In
May 1997 Kasparov played another six games against the
second generation of Deep Blue, Deeper Blue. The match
opened with a Kasparov win followed by a Deep(er) Blue
victory in the second game. Games 3, 4, and 5 were draws
and the computer proceeded to win in the sixth game when
Kasparov resigned after only 19 moves following an un-
characteristic blunder. This clinched the tournament with
3.5 points for Deep(er) Blue versus 2.5 for Kasparov. Hu-
man mastery of the world of chess, observers proclaimed,
had come to an end. The “Information Age,” an IBM ex-
ecutive proclaimed, “has finally begun” (cited in Cook &
Kroker, 1997).
Indeed, a look, however cursory, at the media cov-
erage inspired by the two tournaments—“Deep Blue’s
victory proves giant step for computerkind” (Harding &
Barden inThe Guardian, 1997: 5); “IBM Chess Machine
Beats Humanity’s Champ” (Weber in The New York Times,
1997)7 —is enough to show that something more was
involved than the testing of the latest chess computer.
Rather, in media narratives the tournaments provided a
way of articulating broader cultural anxieties and expec-
tations about the human sphere being encroached by the
machine: “Remember, Neanderthal man once thought he
was in control. If machines can master the Sicilian Defence
(Scheveningen Variation), none of us is safe” (Moss, 2005,
p. 21).
The tournaments were thus opportunities to reflect on
Occidental8 modernity’s relationship with its technol-
ogy, something that has provoked profound debate over
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preoccupying the literary exponents and opponents of AI
could be seen as prefigured in the Enlightenment fasci-
nation with the notion of the automaton and the associ-
ated reflections on the nature of the relationship between
the natural and artificial, the human and the mechani-
cal (e.g., Schaffer, 1994, 1995; Winner, 1985; Bloomfield
& Vurdubakis, 1997). If we were to attempt a brief ge-
nealogy of the Asimovian “displacement anxiety” and of
the role of the chessboard as a site for acting it out, a
good place to start might be Descartes’s Sixth Medita-
tion (1968). As is well known, Descartes attempted to
trace out the boundaries of humanity vis-a`-vis animals
and machines—entities with whom humans may appear
to have a number of (for Descartes, superficial) similari-
ties. Well-constructed artificial animals, Descartes argues,
could in principle deceive the observer since animals are
in effect little more than elaborate machines—as are hu-
man bodies. In contrast, automata constructed in a human
form would be easy to expose since such machines would
by definition lack the ability to reason and communicate
with other human beings.
By the second half of the 18th century, however, even
the powers of human reason itself did not appear immune
from the mimetic powers of automata. Thus Julien Offray
de la Mettrie (1912, orig. 1741) argued in his L’Homme
Machine (Man, a Machine) that the differences identified
by Descartes between humans and mechanical beings were
mere differences of degree. Thus,
[Jacques] Vaucanson, who needed more skill for making
his [automaton] flute player than for making his duck, would
have needed still more to make a talking man, a mechanism
no longer to be regarded as impossible, especially in the hands
of another Prometheus.9
As Simon Schaffer (1994, 1995) has shown, it was Von
Kempelen’s mechanical chess-playing Turk that best ex-
emplified the ways in which the ability of automata to sim-
ulate human behavior was seen to challenge the ontologi-
cal boundaries of reason. Throughout the 1780s the Turk
toured the capitals of Europe taking on (and usually defeat-
ing) all opponents.10 Catherine the Great of Russia and
Napoleon are both said to have lost to the all-conquering
Turk.11 Commenting on the automaton’s career in 1783,
Cheterien de Mechel argued that
The most daring idea that a mechanician has ever ventured
to conceive was that of a machine which would imitate in
some way . . . the master work of Creation. Von Kempelen has
not only had the idea, but he carried it out and his chess-player
is, indubitably, the most astonishing automaton that has ever
existed. (reproduced in Chapuis & Droz, 1958, p. 364)
The automaton’s 1784 London visit was accompanied by
the publication of a tract by Von Kempelen’s associate and
biographer, Carl Gotlieb Von Windisch. Entitled Inani-
mate Reason, it challenged contemporary men of learning
to solve the riddle of this mechanical Sphinx by identify-
ing whether and what deception was involved. At the same
time, the very possibility of “inanimate reason,” however
playfully employed, also hinted that the Cartesian bound-
aries of humanity were far less secure that had hitherto
been imagined.
Over the next three decades the workings of the Turk,
now owned and managed by musical engineer and impre-
sario Johann Maelzel (inventor of the metronome), was the
subject of both learned treatises and wild flights of fancy.
It was during another visit to London that mathematician
Robert Willis finally solved the puzzle of the Turk. On the
basis of a detailed study of the dimensions of the appara-
tus he showed that there was enough space in the machine
to conceal not a chess-playing dwarf, as many contempo-
raries had suspected, but a normal-sized human being. The
real purpose of the complex mechanism was to produce
sufficient noise to cover any sounds made by this hidden
player.
Nevertheless, the invention of what we now call the
“computer” (the name itself being the usurpation of a ti-
tle formerly accorded to human calculators) renewed the
specter of a mechanism crossing the Cartesian boundary
that separated the automaton’s world of mimesis from the
human world of agency. Machines, it seemed, might soon
come to fulfill the ambition of the modern Prometheus in-
voked by La Mettrie by also replicating human cognitive
functions. Remarking on Charles Babbage’s “analytical
engine” (now routinely described as the first design for a
digital computer), one eminent commentator, the physicist
Sir David Brewster, suggested that:
“Great as the power of mechanism is known to be, yet
we venture to say that many of the most intelligent of our
readers will scarcely admit it to be possible that astronomical
and navigational tables can be accurately computed by ma-
chinery; that the machine can itself correct the errors which
it may commit; and that the results of its calculations, when
absolutely free from error, can be printed off, without the
aid of human hands, or the operation of human intelligence.
All this, however, Mr Babbage’s engine can do.” (quoted in
Cohen, 1966, p. 113)
Whatever we might mean by AI, it reflects the belief that
(perhaps all) “intelligent behaviour can be realised com-
putationally” (McCarthy, 1999). Since the early days of AI
research in the 1950s, playing chess was seen as a particu-
larly accomplished feature of human problem-solving ca-
pabilities and as such has provided a suitable challenge for
the ingenuity of AI researchers.12 John McCarthy (2002,
p. 6) quotes AI researcher Alexander Kronrod to the effect
that “Chess is the Drosophilia of AI.”13 AI researchers,
in other words, study chess for much the same reason
geneticists study the fruit fly, as the gateway to greater




























72 B. P. BLOOMFIELD AND T. VURDUBAKIS
behavior. As Claude Shannon (1950, p. 55) put it in
1949:
Although [Programming a Computer for Playing Chess
is] perhaps of no practical importance, the question is of
theoretical interest, and it is hoped that a satisfactory solution
of this problem will act as a wedge in attacking other problems
of a similar nature and of greater significance.
But there is another reason for the role chess has played
in the cultural imagery of AI. In particular, chess has long
been used to render “intelligent behavior” into a specta-
cle. As Hamilton (2000) argues, chess contests generate
“the effect of spectacular intelligence.” This makes chess
an obvious means for demonstrating progress toward the
eventual (if vague) goal of an “artificial intelligence.” For
instance, in 2001 HAL is seen playing chess and winning,
thereby demonstrating the machine’s status as an “artificial
intelligence.”14
The game of chess does, of course, carry a heavy load of
culturally specific connotations of rational control, mental
conquest and conflict15 (e.g., Figure 1, which accompa-
nied part of The Guardian’s coverage of the 1996 tour-
FIG. 1. Kasparov vs. Deep Blue (courtesy of Spike Gerrell).
nament between Kasparov and Deep Blue). This image
of the chessboard as an intellectual battlefield is, how-
ever, by no means unavoidable.16 In Italo Calvino’s (1979)
Invisible Cities, for instance, the chessboard is inter alia a
site for a meeting of minds between those who come from
different worlds: the Mongol conqueror Kubla Khan and
Marco Polo the Venetian Merchant (see Kallinikos, 1995).
It is, nevertheless, the imagery of combat that has tended
to haunt discussions of machine prowess in chess. Thus
astronaut Frank Poole’s defeat to HAL in 2001 seems to
symbolically presage the latter’s murderous rampage in its
attempt to take control of the spaceship—to which Poole
falls first victim.
As early as 1958, Herbert Simon and Allan Newell
had made the prediction that a computer would be world
chess champion within a decade—thus representing the
quest for AI in the form of a struggle between human
being and machine. Clearly that prediction turned out
to be overoptimistic, but the notion of chess as a site
of contestation quickly became instituted through a se-
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Deep(er) Blue triumph over Kasparov is now billed as the
climax.17
One of the longest-running surprises in computing is just
how difficult it has been to duplicate the ability of top hu-
man chess players with the aid of computers. For over thirty
years now, computer scientists have been predicting that com-
puters would be able to play better than any human ‘within
five to ten years.’ After such a long period of failed predic-
tions, it may seem that the alternative view, preferred by some
psychologists and (understandably) chess players, that hu-
man judgement would always remain superior to algorithms,
may be correct. It is my opinion that only the timescale was
wrong, and that the 1990s will start a new era—one in which
chess no longer belongs to the arena where human intellect
reigns supreme, but is transferred to the growing domain of
intellectual tasks performed best by machine. (Beal, 1991,
p. vii)
For Herbert Simon it was clear that whatever the official
IBM line might be, Deep Blue was a realization of the
sort of machine he had anticipated some 30 years previ-
ously. Commenting on IBM’s evident preoccupation with
the computational aspects or qualities of Deep Blue, Her-
bert Simon (Simon & Munakata, 1997) emphasized its
knowledge of chess. During those 30 years, one of the prin-
cipal opponents of the view that “it’s only a matter of time”
had been Hubert Dreyfus, a persistent critic of the claims of
what is sometimes referred as “the strong program” in arti-
ficial intelligence research (e.g., Dreyfus, 1972; Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1992). In a contest staged at MIT in 1968, Drey-
fus was himself beaten by a chess program—MacHack.18
“L’Affaire Dreyfus,” as it has come to be known (McCor-
duck, 1979),19 immediately became a powerful metaphor
for the coming victory for the AI research program over
its detractors.
More than two centuries after Kempelen’s Turk and
Windisch’s provocative tract, we are still, it seems,
wrestling with the notion of the thinking machine. At the
close of the 20th century, chess, where artificial intelli-
gence, “inanimate reason,” first dared speak its name, was
once more providing a focus for Occidental modernity’s
ambivalent reflections on its emblematic object, the ma-
chine. The vocabulary used in the press coverage of the
contests is revealing here. For instance, the IBM comput-
ers were frequently compared to monsters: for example,
by David Levy in The Guardian (Levy, 1995); by Ray
Monk in The Observer (1996); and (reportedly) by Kas-
parov himself (Tran, 1996b). In what sense do Deep Blue
and Deeper Blue qualify as monsters? One obvious an-
swer is that the term alludes to their awesome powers of
calculation. Indeed, the topic figured prominently in media
accounts of Deep Blue.
The new system will be able to examine 50-100 billion
positions during the three minutes allocated to each move.
(Levy, 1996 p. 6)
“We’ve got one of the greatest concentrations of comput-
ing power ever focused on a single problem working here.”
(J. Hoane, IBM scientist, quoted in Tran, 1996a, p. 12)
The calculative powers of Deeper Blue were, if anything,
twice as awesome. According to Feng-Hsiung Hsu, IBM
scientist, speaking to USA Today:
“It can analyse 200 million chess positions per second,
twice as many as last year (ie1996). At times, Deep Blue will
evaluate up to 74 ply (moves by each player) in advance.
Kasparov and fellow chess masters typically evaluate about
10 moves in advance.” (Kim, 1997)
What is crucial, however, is that such (monstrous) calcu-
lative powers are seen as manifestations of what we might
call a “cold reason,” that is reason divorced from the human
condition. Mary Douglas (1966) has suggested that “mon-
sters” are to be understood as constituting violations of a
morally charged and culturally rooted, classificatory or-
der. Machines are commonly conceived as instruments of
human will and extensions of human agency (Kallinikos,
1995). In contrast, the framing of the Kasparov–Deep(er)
Blue competitions in confrontational terms hinted darkly at
the prospect of an autonomous technology, a technology
outside, or even contesting, human control.20 Thus, the
notion of the “intelligent machine” merges contradictory
signifiers into a single identity. A machine, conventionally
understood as an object designed for, and dedicated to,
the assistance of human actors is here (re)presented as an
independent agent. The representation and perception of
Deep(er) Blue as something monstrous is thus an expres-
sion of its anomalous status as an entity which appears
not to respect classificatory boundaries. In other words,
Deep(er) Blue may seem monstrous to the extent that its
properties threaten the boundary between subject and ob-
ject, human agents and machines. Indeed, following his
defeat in the second game of the 1997 rematch Kasparov
is on record as describing Deep Blue as “an alien oppo-
nent” (quoted in Barden, 1997). We might see the philo-
sophical heat and media interest attached to the “human
versus machine” chess matches as a confirmation that what
was seen to be at stake is nothing less than human self-
understanding. People no longer compete with trains as
they did at the dawn of the railway age, it is now taken
for granted that machines are faster, stronger, etc.; what
is disturbing for so many is the notion that the mind, the
locus of free will and human choice, can be accounted
for in mechanical terms and replicated in a machine, the
representative par excellence of standardization and pre-
dictability (Kallinikos, 1992).
Against this backdrop, Kasparov appeared to have been
anointed by the media as the champion of humanity com-
ing forth to battle the mechanical monster, a title that he
in turn appeared in all modesty happy to accept. Clearly
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easily. Indeed, this was why so much hung on the Great
Human Hope, Kasparov the champion, who, it has been
claimed, felt that it was his “mission to safeguard the chess
world from the march of the machine” (Jones, 1994; see
also: Wright, 1996).
Gary Kasparov. . . sees himself as the “last man standing”
in a mission to save chess from being turned into a mathe-
matical formula.21
In fact the implications of the seemingly unstoppable
march of computer chess machines were also rehearsed
after a previous defeat for Kasparov in 1994. For exam-
ple, in discussing the success of the relatively cheap com-
puter program Chess Genius 222 in a match played at high
speed,23 Robertson commented in The Times (1994, p.
19):
“If a few silicon chips can surpass one of the human’ race’s
intellectual champions, what does it say for the rest of the
herd? If it is not brainpower that sets us apart from our fellow-
mammals, what is it?”
Kasparov himself echoed this argument in the run up to
the 1997 rematch:
“People want to believe that the world champion is some-
how protecting the most sensitive area of our self esteem.
Brain superiority is something that keeps us in charge of the
planet. And if it is challenged in chess, who knows what will
happen?” (interview with USA Today, Kim, 1997)
Echoing Descartes, the suggestion here is that chal-
lenges to the boundary between humans and machines—
represented by contests between human experts and chess
programs—resonate with the boundary between people
and animals. Put another way, the concession of esoteric
reasoning skills to machines could be read as a pointer to
the mechanical basis of intelligence. Therefore it is not
simply the human–machine boundary represented by es-
oteric skills such as chess that is at stake, but the very
distinctiveness of the human in the evolutionary order of
things.
Of course, another tenable reading of the Kasparov–
Deep(er) Blue contest is to emphasize the fact that a
computer is after all a human construction and that there-
fore its achievements might be cause for (human) celebra-
tion rather than existential angst. In this version, Deep and
Deeper Blue stand out as pinnacles of human ingenuity
and creativity. In fact, it is possible to find both gloomy
and celebratory views of the contest within the same ar-
ticle (e.g., Time, Krauthammer, 1996). However, in the
main, commentaries and media treatments of the contest
predominantly employed a language of anxiety rather than
celebration. Kasparov’s defeat was claimed to represent a
milestone in the zero-sum contest between humanity and
machinery: “the defeat of human intelligence and the tri-
umph of digital intelligence” (Cook and Kroker, 1997).
Understandably, IBM was at pains to distance Deep(er)
Blue from the Frankenstein complex as portrayed in 2001,
the Matrix, or Terminator:
This match is not about competition between people and
machines. It is a demonstration of what makes us human
beings so different from computers. (emphasis added)24
In addition, IBM’s prematch and postmatch publicity made
great play of how Deep(er) Blue’s technology would soon
be adapted for use in weather prediction, pharmaceutical
research, financial markets and other applications benefi-
cial to humanity (e.g., Hargrave, 1997; Kim, 1997).
THE RISE OF THE MACHINES?
Who or what deserves the credit for beating Kasparov? Deep
Blue is clearly the best candidate. Yes, we may join in con-
gratulating Feng-hsiung Hsu and the IBM team on the success
of their handiwork, but in the same spirit we might congratu-
late Kasparov’s teachers, handlers, and even his parents. But
no matter how assiduously they may have trained him, drum-
ming into his head the importance of one strategic principle
or another, they didn’t beat Deep Blue in the [1996] series;
Kasparov did. (Dennett, 1996)
However prominent the “(hu)man versus machine” billing
might have been, there are reasons that make the task of
identification of Kasparov and Deep(er) Blue with those
ontological categories less straightforward than Dennett
suggests or the press coverage would lead us to expect.
These reasons can be glimpsed in the coverage of the less
remarked upon aspects of the games. First, we have al-
ready mentioned, or alluded to, the fact that facing Kas-
parov across the chessboard was a succession of IBM
scientists who physically moved the pieces as instructed
by Deep(er) Blue.25 But further, it is notable that be-
fore Game 2 of the first tournament, Deep Blue’s handlers
misplaced a file instructing the machine how to play the
opening moves, thereby leaving the computer “to impro-
vise” (Kim, 1997). On other occasions the operators placed
pieces in the “wrong position”—we might say that the op-
erators had not followed what the machine (Deep Blue)
had said/instructed. In one such case Kasparov had already
made his move by the time the “mistake” was corrected
(ibid.). These instances, together with their interpretation
as glitches or in terms of operator error, reinforced the no-
tion that (logical) machines do not make errors whereas
(fallible) human beings do.
Second, there were accounts of how Deep Blue had
broken down during play in the fourth game of the 1996
tournament:
Although the world champion confessed to being ex-
hausted after the game, his opponent is also showing signs
of strain and crashed after Kasparov made his apparently
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visibly agitated and nervously paced the stage while IBM
technicians took 15 minutes to repair the fault and re-establish
contact with Deep Blue’s base. The problem seems to have
been stress, with the computer reacting adversely to Kas-
parov’s cautious game. (Barden, 1996a: 26)
This commentary can be seen as a typical example of the
tendency to anthropomorphize the machine, to project hu-
man psychological parameters onto it and thus analyze
its “behavior” in such terms. In fact, Kasparov’s reputed
advantage over his usual (human) opponents due to his
very stature in chess was frequently cited as one factor
that would not have a bearing on his encounters with Deep
Blue. Thus the cold logic of the machine would not be
bowed in any way by his reputation. As things turned out,
particularly in the second tournament, many commentators
observed that this time it was Kasparov who was showing
signs of psychological stress. Describing Kasparov’s state
of mind following the defeat in the second game of the re-
match, Khodarkovsky and Shamkovich (1997: 203) state
that he was “terribly frustrated” by his inability to fathom
Deep(er) Blue’s play and in consequence this affected his
preparation for the next encounter. It would seem that the
pressure really told in the final game:
“The computer was beyond my understanding and I was
scared.” (Kasparov quoted in Tran, 1997, p. 1)
We could therefore conclude that a logic that could not
be unfathomed by the world’s greatest chess champion had
indeed won out over frail human psychology. However, if
we look a little further and again consider the role of the
IBM team then matters are not so straightforward. To see
why, we can usefully explore some of the machinations
between the two camps that followed Kasparov’s defeat
in the second game of the 1997 rematch. After that game,
which puzzled many other chess experts as well as the
Kasparov team, the latter demanded to see the printouts
kept by the IBM team. Kasparov wanted to understand the
logic behind some of the moves. This was refused by his
opponents. Such was the furor that allegations of cheating
began to circulate in the media, suggesting that the IBM
team had actually been offering human assistance dur-
ing the game. Thus one headline ran: “Computer cheats
at chess says champion” (The Sunday Times, 1997, p. 1).
The allegation of cheating has an intriguing parallel with
the case of Von Kempelen’s Turk, where it was assumed
by many that human agency had to lie behind the automa-
ton’s apparent powers at chess—there had to be a trick.
In the case of Deep(er) Blue a similar line of reasoning
and attribution of skills and agency was in operation: Ei-
ther the computer must have received human help in the
second game of 1997 because its moves were too human
for it to be otherwise, or chess had indeed been reduced to
calculation and Kasparov was doomed.26
The IBM team offered to make the printouts public, but
only after the end of the tournament. The matter went to
the Appeals Board and eventually the IBM team offered to
pass the printouts of the second match to an independent
third party, a computer scientist named Ken Thompson.
However, Khodarkovsky and Shamkovich (1997, p. 209)
argue that during the third game they had still not been
sent to Thompson and that C. J. Tan of the IBM team had
even asked whether they were still needed. As they saw
it: “Once again C. J. Tan was stonewalling us.” This “war
of the printouts” (Khodarkovsky & Shamkovich, 1997, p.
202) was adduced to have been a form of psychological
warfare against Kasparov. Whether this was intentional or
not, it is evident that the role of the IBM team was more
than that of mere operators. Indeed, even the nature of the
IBM team—the exact complement of personnel—would
seem to have been somewhat problematic. More specifi-
cally, Khodarkovsky and Shamkovich voice their concerns
(1997, p. 204) about the precise role of the two grandmas-
ters (Nick De Firmian and John Fedorowicz) who were
secretly brought in as advisors—a factor that further con-
tributed to the pressure on Kasparov: “[it] added fuel to
our suspicions that unknowingly, we were facing the ef-
forts of an untold number of grandmasters. Why was their
participation kept secret?”
These arguments can be viewed in terms of a struggle
over the identity and ontological status of Deep(er) Blue:
If Kasparov’s opponent was just a machine then why did
its play seem so much “unlike” a machine at times? The
converse of the supposition of cheating was the suggestion
that Deep(er) Blue could play real chess:
“The scientists say that Deep Blue is only calculating,
but it showed signs of intelligence in our second game.”
(Kasparov quoted in Barden, 1997, p. 25)
This relates to a third aspect of the blurring of categories
in the Kasparov—Deep(er) Blue encounters—namely, the
continuity of the machine. It seems that to a certain de-
gree Deep(er) Blue was actually reprogrammed in between
games in order to try and prevent Kasparov from exploit-
ing any perceived weaknesses he might have exposed in
earlier games.27 Indeed, reflecting on the victory at the end
of the 1997 rematch and the improvements to Deep Blue,
the IBM team noted that as well as Deep(er) Blue’s in-
creased computational power and additional chess knowl-
edge, they had also developed their ability to change pa-
rameters between games.28 This lack of transparency
concerning the computer’s programming in any particu-
lar game, and thus the logic behind the moves chosen, was
another source of the intense frustration experienced by
Kasparov in seeking to identify its Achilles heel.
Fourth, it is useful to focus on the games that were
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The operator may offer a draw, accept a draw or resign
on behalf of Deep Blue. This may be done with or without
consulting Deep Blue.29
Shortly after the first tournament, in an interview with
Scientific American magazine, IBM team member Mur-
ray Campbell stated: “The computer doesn’t ever accept
draws. If we want to, we can accept a draw, but it will
never accept a draw. It’s in the rules.”30 Accordingly, we
can examine the matter of how draws were offered (or
rejected) and thus how the drawn games were achieved—
not in terms of chess play itself (that is the specific moves
which precipitated a draw), but rather as an agreement.
For example, the fourth game of the 1996 match was
drawn, but only after some interesting twists. Writing in
The Guardian, Leonard Barden (1996a: 26) relates what
happened:
At move 41 he (Kasparov) had the ignominy of having his
draw offer declined but then he fought back with a rook-for-
knight sacrifice and accepted a move-50 draw proposal from
Deep Blue’s operator. (emphasis added)
This was followed by an even more telling incident in the
fifth game when after 23 moves Kasparov offered a draw.
Again, we refer to The Guardian’s chess correspondent to
describe what happened next:
The machine was not programmed to respond and, after its
operator declined the proposal “in the interests of science,”
it made a series of weak moves and was soon a bishop down.
(Barden, 1996b, p. 21, emphasis added)
Kasparov went on to win the game.31
A similar pattern emerges if we examine the draws in
the 1997 tournament:
after completing his 48th move... Kasparov offered a draw
to Deep Blue’s Feng-Hsiung Hsu (one of the IBM scientists).
Hsu conferred briefly with other members of the team, then
accepted.32
What is important about such instances is the way in which
they illuminate the nature of the relationship between the
human beings involved and the computer. Thus, the offer-
ing and acceptance (or rejection) of a draw was a matter of
judgment for the human operator and the rest of the IBM
team. A fifth but related area concerns the matter of how
games are won or lost. For instance, the sixth game of the
1996 match (won by Kasparov) did not result in an actual
checkmate:
Deep Blue’s operator had little choice but to resign, since
all the Black pieces were tied down on the Queen’s side,
leaving the King virtually defenceless.33
In other words, the “operator” interpreted the position on
the chessboard and decided that further play was pointless.
Again it was the operator’s “human” initiative that was
involved in resigning the first game of the 1997 tournament
when the position seemed futile: “on move 45 . . . the Deep
Blue team tendered its resignation.”34
Finally, and concerning the games that were won, De
Firmian (1999, p. vii) (U.S. chess champion and one of the
grandmasters recruited in Deeper Blue’s winning team)
provides a significant clue when he states:
Lest history evaluate this epic “Man vs Machine” contest
incorrectly, Kasparov played much worse than usual, trying a
faulty anti-computer strategy when he would likely have won
by normal play. I had a special perspective in this match as I
worked with IBM on this project and set Deep Blue’s open-
ing moves for its two victories. In these games the computer
emerged with a large opening advantage (before it even began
to “think”), which put Kasparov in a hole. Chess openings are
very difficult for computers unless they simply repeat human
moves. Imagination and strategic thinking will always be two
strengths humans have over computers. (emphasis added)
Put another way, De Firmian is in essence claiming that it
was because of him (as the one who set the opening moves)
that Deep(er) Blue was able to beat Kasparov in 1997.
Taken together, these features of the two tournaments
indicate the difficulty in sustaining an account that consis-
tently represents the matches as being between two dis-
tinct or (pure) categories—human and nonhuman agency.
It is possible of course to analyze Kasparov’s role in the
same terms we have applied to Deep Blue. Accordingly,
Kasparov could be viewed as the front man for a team
effort—including computers as well as other human be-
ings. On the one hand, Kasparov had a team of advisors
though it would appear that their advice was not always
appreciated. For example, Tran (1997) reported in The
Guardian that in the postmortem of the 1997 tournament
Kasparov noted his poor preparation as well as “bad ad-
vice, saying his greatest mistake was to listen to computer
specialists.” On the other hand, Kasparov has developed
his game via a PC chess program called HIARC:
“These days all chess professionals use computers to
check their analysis. That’s exactly what I do. . . . Today it
takes me ten minutes to do what took five hours a few years
ago” (Kasparov, interviewed in USA Today, (quoted in Kim,
1997)
Indeed, commenting on the preparations for the 1997 re-
match, Khodarkovsky35 and Shamkovich (1997, p. 180)
report: “Gary and his team took up residence in the
Plaza hotel and in his suite were some special compan-
ions: three computers!”36 These machines were used in-
between games to analyze Deep(er) Blue’s play and thus
inform Kasparov’s stratagems for dealing with it.
But the entanglement of human and machine in Kas-
parov’s play can perhaps be best illustrated with reference
to the second game of the 1997 rematch tournament in
which Kasparov resigned on the point of his 46th move ap-
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aftermath there was much praise for the superior play of
Deeper Blue, but later analysis involving various grand-
masters and their own chess computers revealed a more
complex situation. As it transpired, Deeper Blue’s 46th
move was a mistake in that it could have let Kasparov se-
cure a draw by moving to a situation of perpetual check.
The fact that Kasparov—uncharacteristically—failed to
see this possibility, hence his premature resignation, has
been attributed to the fact that he presumed that the compu-
tational power of Deeper Blue, which involved the ability
to look ahead at many layers of possible moves and which
underpinned its tactical strength, had analyzed the situa-
tion thoroughly (see Khodarkovsky & Shamkovich, 1997,
pp. 193–206; King, 1997, p. 73). Thus, we might say that
while Kasparov tried to play in a way that would exploit
the weaknesses of computer chess—for instance, in terms
of strategy, and the relative positioning of pieces—he also
informed his own decisions by the computer’s much trum-
peted computational powers and ability to analyze many
millions of moves per second; in this instance, we might
suggest that his own play was, so to speak, crucially shaped
by expectations concerning the “agency of the machine.”
It is therefore worth revisiting the argument made by De
Firmian (1999) and others to the effect that computer op-
ponents have tended to elicit a different kind of play from
the human champion(s). It is not merely that Kasparov
or for that matter his successor(s) in the role adapt their
play to neutralize the perceived strengths and exploit the
weaknesses of their machine adversaries. Rather, some-
thing more may have been going on. Commenting on the
inability of Kasparov and of his successor to the world
title, Vladimir Kramnik,37 to manage anything better than
draws in their respective (post-Deep Blue) “man versus
machine” tournaments against what most commentators
consider inferior chess programs, Feng-Hsiung Hsu (2002,
p. 275) questions whether
the two computers [were] really playing at Vladimir or
Garry’s level? The match scores said so. Do I believe that? Yes
and no. Vladimir and Garry were playing at the computers’
level but the computers were not playing at the level that
Vladimir and Garry are capable of.
The “human champions” were playing at the level of their
computer opponents rather than vice versa. In particular,
the human champions appeared not to be making full use
of their main advantage—i.e., chess knowledge. (Recall,
for instance, De Firmian’s 1999 comments cited earlier,
or Kasparov’s resignation instead of forcing a draw in the
second game of the 1997 tournament—not the reaction one
would expect from a grandmaster). “Why couldn’t the top
two humans bring their chess knowledge to bear in [those
games they lost]?” (Hsu, 2002, p. 276). His hunch is that
“they [Kramnik and Kasparov] were overwhelmed by the
pressure not to lose [to a computer]” (ibid, emphasis in
FIG. 2. Vladimir Kramnik vs. Deep Fritz (2006).38
original). They were in other words brought down not by
the calculative powers of their opponents but under the
weight of their own (self-assumed) symbolic role.
DISCUSSION
As the stubborn persistence of the “(hu)man vs. ma-
chine” frame reminds us (e.g., Fig. 2), chess contests have
long functioned as allegories for Occidental anxieties con-
cerning the status of the human subject. It is therefore
hardly surprising that human chess champions have re-
fused to accept their defeat by computer programs with
equanimity and have been unable to resist scratching that
particular scab again and again. Immediately after his 1997
defeat, Kasparov demanded a rematch with Deep(er) Blue,
this time offering to compete with it for the World Champi-
onship (!), a rematch that for whatever reasons never mate-
rialized (e.g., Hsu, 2002, pp. 270–271). Deep(er) Blue has
now reportedly been dismantled, taking its secrets with
it (Hartson, 1997).39 Its short but glorious career, IBM
claimed, was but a prelude to the application of its tech-
nology in other areas of expertise. Those who had their
suspicions regarding its 1997 success will now have to go
with their questions left unanswered. But were they the
right questions to start with?
Lucy Suchman (2007, p. 1) has argued that ques-
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question, namely of how the entities in question come to
be framed/configured as human or artificial “prior to our
analyses.” To answer this question we need to look again
at our ways of sorting out what is human from what is not.
The late Jacques Derrida (1976) used the term “supple-
ment” as shorthand for that “inessential extra” that needs
to be added in order to complete and enhance the pres-
ence of something which already claims to be complete
and self-sufficient. But clearly, Derrida argues, anything
that needs a supplement cannot be already complete on its
own. Following this line of argument the “human” and the
“machine” contestants of the Kasparov versus Deep(er)
Blue contests can be said to be deeply involved with one
another in a relationship of mutual (in)determination and
supplementarity. “Human” and “machine” appear as, or
are claimed to be, wholly present and self-sufficient, and
to need the other merely as an appendage, an afterthought
(e.g., see Dennett, 1996, quoted earlier in this article).
However, upon more systematic (re)examination, what
was described as external and inessential often turns out
to be compensating for an essential lack, to be filling in a
hole, in the original. In a not dissimilar move, Bruno La-
tour (1993, p. 78) has argued that while the world is made
up of “hybrid” entities, Occidental accounts of agency tend
to break such hybrids apart in order to identify what came
from the subject (the human) and what came from the ob-
ject (the technology). In this account, we start with hybrids
and try to obtain the “human” and the “technical” out of
them rather than vice versa. Agency is seen to reside ei-
ther in the machine or in the people behind the machine. In
Latourian terms, however, both are products of processes
of purification. As he notes in A Dialog in Honor of HAL
(Latour & Powers, 1998):
The idea of a test matching a naked, isolated intelligent
human against an isolated naked automated machine seems
to me as unrealistic. . . Things and people are too much in-
tertwined to be partitioned before the test begins, especially
to capture this most heavily equipped of all faculties: intelli-
gence.
Human versus machine contests are thus, according to
Latour, little more than shadowboxing. The machines—or
for that matter the humans—that battle each other on these
occasions are in this view creatures of legend, products of
our culture-specific forms of storytelling. If so, what is it
that compels us to tell such stories? Furthermore, what is
it that incites us to make these stories, as it were, “come
true” through elaborate staging(s)?
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Sherry Turkle (1984) has famously described the digital
computer as a “Second Self.” Such a description carries
a heavy symbolic load. Among other things, it evokes
an image of the computer as a creature of Occidental40
modernity’s claimed “demiurgic ambition to exorcise the
natural substance of a thing in order to substitute a syn-
thetic one.” (Baudrillard, 1983, pp. 88–89). Here again
HAL, the mythological intelligent machine by reference
to which the story of the future of AI is often narrated
(e.g., Stork, 1997; Vendy and Nofz, 1999; Bloomfield,
2003)—and on whose “birthday” the human dominance
of the world of chess is said to have ended—is illustrative.
For what is HAL’s crime but the Original Sin? Moderns,
having created thinking machines in their own image, im-
mediately expect that these machines will—just like they
themselves did—attempt to usurp the powers of their cre-
ator. Thus Hans Moravec (1988, p. 1) speculates about a
“postbiological” future “in which the human race has been
swept away . . . usurped by its own artificial progeny.” It is
perhaps paradoxical but not unexpected that AI, the enter-
prise that is said to epitomize the workings of reason, is at
the same time so heavily mythologized (Turney, 1998).
Anthropologists such as Nancy Munn (1986), Brian
Pfaffenberger (1995), and others have drawn attention to
the ways in which technological artifacts are more than
merely functional objects but may also serve to constitute
occasions where the categories and distinctions that give
meaning to social life are enacted. In her account of com-
puters as “evocative objects” Turkle (1984, p. 31) echoes
this point when she argues that objects “[o]n the lines be-
tween categories . . . draw attention to how we have drawn
the lines. Sometimes . . . they incite us to reaffirm the lines,
sometimes to call them into question, simulating different
distinctions.” Turkle’s main focus is on the social psychol-
ogy of human–computer interaction. Our own focus in this
article has been rather different. We have argued here that
to the extent to which computational artefacts do come to
play such a role, they do not do so, as it were, “naturally,”
by virtue of their inherent qualities but as part of specific
social performances. We could therefore “read” human
versus “intelligent” machine contests, from Kempelen’s
Turk to IBM’s Deep(er) Blue, as events where some of
the central philosophical and moral conflicts of Occiden-
tal modernity were/are dramatized: self vs. other; identity
vs. difference; free will vs. determinism; subject vs. object;
nature vs. artifice, and so forth.
Lucy Suchman (2007) makes a relevant point in relating
her encounters with MIT’s robots Cog and Kismet, arti-
facts we might say of the “bottom-up” (i.e., behavioural
and embodied) approach to AI as opposed to that of ab-
stract symbol manipulation dating from the 1950s (Bloom-
field & Vurdubakis, 1997).41 In it, she notes that the
ability of these artifacts to act out the role of what we
might call a (potential) “Second Self,” was crucially de-
pendent upon specific practices of framing. These “fram-
ings” served to locate the various human labors, relation-
ships, and technologies upon which their performance
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chess tournaments under discussion here it is notable that
many of the media representations routinely cropped out
the IBM operators.42 Our own analysis of Deep(er) Blue’s
successes and failures has suggested a relational view of
“intelligence”: that is to say “intelligence” not as a prop-
erty located “inside” the machine “itself” but as crucially
dependent on the performative capabilities of its “oper-
ators.” We have therefore endeavored to remain atten-
tive to the “missing supplement,” that which is left out
by the “[hu]man versus machine” framing that has dom-
inated narrations of the Kasparov–Deep Blue (and subse-
quent) tournaments. Even this dominant media frame, we
have argued, affords glimpses of a less brightly lit “back-
stage” and of the shifting human–technical assemblages
that make possible a “front stage” where “man versus ma-
chine” drama is performed before the eyes of a watching
world.
NOTES
1. This was the original title of Warwick’s (1997) book In the Mind
of the Machine.
2. King Canute’s fabled attempt to turn the tide is usually (and un-
fairly) cited as an example of out of control megalomania. In fact the
king’s purpose was to give a lesson in humility to his sycophantic
courtiers. It is said that after that incident Canute never again wore his
crown but hung it instead in Winchester Cathedral.
3. In one of Asimov’s short stories (That Thou Art Mindful of Him)
intelligent robots, designed to serve humanity, have become so ad-
vanced that they come to the conclusion that they fit the definition of
the “human” much better than their creators and thus need to serve no
one but themselves (Asimov, 1976).
4. Kurzweil’s framing of the past and future development of AI in
anthropomorphic terms which suggests both replication of, and com-
petition with, human beings is far from unique. Rather it is a standard
feature of the “literary enterprise of AI.” For instance, another techno-
logical timeline is offered by researchers at British Telecommunications
plc. It includes: “AI Entity gains degree 2013–217. . . AI Entity gains
PhD 2020s. . . Robots mentally and physically superior to humans
2030s”.http://www.btplc.com/Innovation/News/timeline/Technology
Timeline.pdf (accessed October 30, 2007).
5. For example, see Latour and Powers (1998). AI narratives in both
fiction and nonfiction often have recourse to biblical imagery, from
Multivac the computer in Asimov’s The Last Question (Asimov, 1986),
to Wintermute in Gibson’s (1984) Neuromancer, and from Moravec’s
(1988) Mind Children, to Warwick’s (1998) In the Mind of the Machine
(see also Davis, 1999).
6. For a fuller discussion see Bloomfield (2003).
7. This article also appears under the title “Swift and
Slashing, Computer Topples Kasparov,” New York Times,
May 12, 1997. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9903E5D91039F931A25756C0A961958260 (accessed November 1,
2007).
8. We use the term “Occidental” here to acknowledge the fact that
the view of machines—and of “intelligent machines” in particular—in
other (say, Japanese or Korean) cultures is often quite different.
9. The notion of a “Modern Prometheus” of course became the
theme of Mary Shelley’s (1992, orig, 1818) Frankenstein.
10. The apparatus was presented to the public as a puzzle, a chal-
lenge to identify the location of the automaton’s intelligence. This is
how Edgar Allan Poe (1855/1982: 425–426) describes the prelude to a
performance in Richmond, Virginia:
“Maelzel now informs the company that he will disclose to
their view the mechanism of the machine . . . . and throws the
cupboard fully open to the inspection of all present. Its whole
interior is apparently filled with wheels, pinions, levers, and
other machinery, crowded very closely together, . . . . he goes
now round to the back of the box, and raising the drapery of
the figure, opens another door situated precisely in the rear
of the one first opened. Holding a lighted candle at this door,
and shifting the position of the whole machine repeatedly at
the same time, a bright light is thrown entirely through the
cupboard, which is now clearly seen to be full, completely
full, of machinery.”
11. Legends that quickly became part of the mystique of the au-
tomaton and related in stories and plays such as La Czarine (1968) by
Adenis and Gastineau (Chapuis & Droz, 1958, p. 365).
12. In fact, the interest in chess and computers predates the birth of
AI in 1956. For instance, it was discussed earlier by Wiener (1950), who
saw the domain of chess as but a forerunner of applications in other
areas requiring complex decision making. But as things have turned
out, it isn’t the most esoteric areas of problem solving (chess, analytical
mathematical problems etc.) that have proved most recalcitrant to AI
work but rather the most mundane features of everyday intelligence
such as common sense knowledge.
13. Thus drawing “an analogy with geneticists’ use of that fruit fly.”
14. As Stork (n.d.) notes in an essay on the IBM website, in the
Arthur C. Clarke (1968) novel of the film, “HAL is programmed to lose
50% of the time—to keep things interesting for the astronauts.” Whether
it would have that effect is debatable since it would have changed
chess from a game of skill to a game of chance. Interestingly, “Kubrick
originally filmed the ‘chess scene’ with a five-in-a-row board game
called pentominoes but chose not to use it, believing that viewers would
better appreciate the difficulties involved in a chess game” (Campbell,
1997).
15. A bloodless mimesis of the conflict of war, as usefully noted
by one of the reviewers for this article.
16. We thank one of the reviewers for this point.
17. For a complete chronology of these “human–machine” encoun-
ters up to, and including, the 1996 Kasparov–Deep Blue tournament
see Newborn (1997).
18. For its achievement, MacHack became an honorary member of
the U.S. Chess Federation (Boden, 1977, p. 353).
19. As with all legendary events, different sources offer alternative
dates, for instance, 1967, for his encounter; 1968 is the date given by
Dreyfus (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986).
20. For a discussion of the notion of autonomous technology in
political thought see Winner (1985).
21. Malcolm Pein, London Chess Centre, covering Game 5 of
the 1997 rematch for the IBM web site. http://researchweb.watson.
ibm.com/deepblue/games/game5/html/c.2.html (accessed October 30,
2007).
22. At the time this program was available in the high street at a cost
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(Jones, 1994), it was based on Richard Lang’s program Pentium Chess
Genius (Newborn, 1997).
23. That is, each “player” was allowed only 25 minutes per game
to complete all their moves.
24. This statement was contained on the webpage of the offi-
cial IBM Internet site specially devoted to covering the tournament.
www.chess.ibm.com (accessed February 16, 1996).
25. The IBM team of scientists took turns facing Kasparov.
26. And in another intriguing parallel, the 2006 world chess cham-
pionship between Veselin Topalov and Vladimir Kramnik was marred
by the allegation that the latter used over-frequent visits to the toilet in
order to secretly consult a chess computer (Barden, 2006).
27. Hsu (2002), of the IBM team, discusses the fixing of bugs
within the software in between games. Of course, such attempts to fix
the computer program could work to Kasparov’s advantage insofar as
repairs in one area might merely serve to open up weaknesses elsewhere.
28. http://researchweb.watson.ibm.com/deepblue/meet/html/d.
html (accessed October 30, 2007).
29. http://researchweb.watson.ibm.com/deepblue/watch/html/c.8.
html (accessed October 30, 2007).
30. www.sciam.com/explorations/042197/chess/042197blueinter.
html (accessed October 30, 2007).
31. During an interview with John Horgan (1996) of Scien-
tific American following the 1996 match, one of the IBM team—
Joseph Hoane—complained about the “human error” during the draw





html (accessed October 30, 2007).
33. http://www.research.ibm.com/deepblue/watch/html/c.10.6.
html (accessed October 30, 2007).
34. http://www.research.ibm.com/deepblue/home/may03/story 3.
html (accessed October 30, 2007).
35. Khodarkovsky, a friend of Kasparov, was also a member of his
team.
36. Of course “Kasparov” is also a brand of chess-playing machines,
of which over 100,000 had been sold by the time of the first Kasparov–
Deep Blue confrontation (Krauthammer, 1996).
37. Kramnik donned the mantle of humanity’s defender and in 2001
agreed to take on the reigning computer chess champion Deep Fritz,
arguing that “It will be hard, but I would like to prove that humans
are still worth something” (cited in The Sunday Telegraph, December
23, 2001, p. 14). After a series of inconclusive tournaments Kramnik
finally lost to Deep Fritz in 2006 (Fig. 2).
38. Courtesy of the RAG Group, sponsors of the Kramnik–Deep
Fritz encounter.
39. Only a weaker version, Deep Blue Junior, was to continue the
challenge at chess (Hartson, 1997).
40. See note 6.
41. Developed at MIT’s AI Laboratory, Cog is a human-
like head and torso built to “approximate the sensory and mo-
tor dynamics of a human body” and learn through interac-
tion with humans (http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-
group/cog/overview.html). Also built to explore social interactions,
Kismet is a robot developed to emulate interactions with a “human care-
giver” through, for instance, “gaze direction, facial expression, body
posture, and vocal babbles” in a manner “reminiscent of parent-infant
exchanges” (http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/sociable/overview.html).
See also note 4.
42. For example, in the photograph accompanying The Guardian
article by Tran (1996b). In some accounts the presence of the IBM
operator was very much that of an inessential extra. In an earlier “hu-
man versus machine” encounter, on this occasion between Kasparov
and Deep Thought, Leithauser (1990), writing in The New York Times,
referred to the operator role as “largely secretarial.”
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